FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) -- CIL HARDWARE

NUMBER: 02-1E-002 -X

SUBSYSTEM NAME: LANDING DECELERATION - WHEEL, BRAKE & TIRE

REVISION: 1

02/24/95

PART DATA

PART NAME

VENDOR NAME

PART NUMBER

VENDOR NUMBER

: CHASSIS ASSEMBLY MLG

MC194-0007

LRU

: MLG TIRES

MICHELIN AIRCRAFT TIRE

006-866

EXTENDED DESCRIPTION OF PART UNDER ANALYSIS:

MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES

REFERENCE DESIGNATORS:

QUANTITY OF LIKE ITEMS: 4

TWO RIGHT

FUNCTION:

PROVIDE SUPPORT AND ROLLING CAPABILITY.

FAILURE MODES EFFECTS ANALYSIS FMEA -- CIL FAILURE MODE

NUMBER: 02-1E-002-01

REVISION#:

01/05/99

SUBSYSTEM NAME: LANDING DECELERATION - WHEEL, BRAKE & TIRE

CRITICALITY OF THIS

LRU: MLG TIRES ITEM NAME: MLG TIRES

FAILURE MODE: 1/1

FAILURE MODE:

RUPTURE - TIRE RUPTURES AT MLG TOUCHDOWN BEFORE NOSEGEAR TOUCHDOWN.

MISSION PHASE:

DO DE-ORBIT

VEHICLE/PAYLOAD/KIT EFFECTIVITY:

102 COLUMBIA

103 DISCOVERY

104 ATLANTIS

105 ENDEAVOUR

CAUSE:

EXCESSIVE LOADING, CUTS, POOR FABRICATION.

CRITICALITY 1/1 DURING INTACT ABORT ONLY? NO

REDUNDANCY SCREEN

A) N/A

B) N/A

C) N/A

PASS/FAIL RATIONALE:

A)

B)

C)

FAILURE EFFECTS -

(A) SUBSYSTEM:

LOSS OF ROLLING AND LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY ON AFFECTED TIRE/WHEEL ASSEMBLY.

LOSS OF ADJACENT TIRE/WHEEL ASSEMBLY AND LOSS OF ALL BRAKING CAPABILITY ON AFFECTED STRUT. PROBABLE FAILURE OF AFFECTED MLG STRUT OR ITS. ATTACHMENTS.

(B) INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM(S): SAME AS A

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(C) MISSION:

PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE YAWING FORCES PRODUCED AND/OR LOSS OF 50 PERCENT OF BRAKING CAPABILITY CAUSING VEHICLE TO DEPART RUNWAY.

(D) CREW, VEHICLE, AND ELEMENT(S): SAME AS C.

(E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECTS:

-DISPOSITION RATIONALE-

(A) DESIGN:

TIRE DESIGNED AND MANUFACTURED TO MEET MIL-T-5041F AND MIL-A-8862. MAXIMUM PRESSURE 370 (30 PS) OVERPRESSURE TO ALLOW FOR COLD TEMPERATURE LANDING AND PRESSURE LOSS DURING PAD STAY TIME), MINIMUM BURST PRESSURE 1020. THE TIRE COMPLIES WITH REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-T-5041 FOR EXTRA PRESSURE TUBELESS TIRES, WITH A MINIMUM STATIC RATED LOAD OF 65,700 POUNDS AND HAVE A VELOCITY RATING OF 225 KNOTS.

(B) TEST:

PERFORMED DELTA CERTIFICATION QUALIFICATION TESTS FOR -45° F. TESTS CONSISTED OF:

2 WHEEL/TIRES CYCLE STATIC 14 DAY COLD SOAK -45"(+/-) F AT KSC

4 CYCLES DYNAMIC LANDING LOAD

TIRE INFLATION 363 PSI (70 °F)

CHILL TIRE TO -45°(+/-) F MINIMUM OF 8 HOURS BEFORE START OF TEST

SUBJECT TIRE TO SIMULATED LANDING PROFILE W233MAN BASED ON:

233,000 LB. ORBITER WEIGHT,

1082.0 C.G.,

225 KNOTS AIRSPEED,

5.2 F/SEC SINK RATE,

195 KNOT DEROTATION INITIATION VELOCITY, AND

-1.0 DEG/SEC DEROTATION COMMAND INPUT OVER 1 SECOND.

THIS CYCLE FEATURED A PEAK RADIAL LOAD OF 113,000 LB AND LATERAL LOADING, DUE TO YAWED DYNAMIC ROLLING, OF UP TO 15,450 LB. FULL TREAD LOSS OCCURRED ON FIRST OF 4 LOAD CYCLES AND WAS SIMULAR TO THAT OBSERVED ON ORIGINAL ORBITER MAIN LANDING GEAR QTR, 84012-2-TL,

THEREFORE WAS NOT CONSIDERED A TIRE FAILURE.

QUALIFICATION TESTS: BEAD INSULATION STOCK AND FABRIC ADHESION TESTING WAS CONDUCTED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF MIL-T- 5041F. CERTIFIED TO A BURST

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PRESSURE OF 1020 PSI. THE TIRES MET A DYNAMIC TEST SPECTRUM OF 4 TO 6 SIMULATED MISSION CYCLES INCLUDING CROSSWIND AND TAXI TESTS. -

A DYNAMIC TEST TO SATISFY A MAX RADIAL LOAD OF 142,5 KIPS WAS PERFORMED: TEST CONDITIONS INCLUDED 20 KNOTS CROSSWIND, 225 KNOTS TOUCHDOWN VELOCITY, USING A 55/45 TIRE LOAD DISTRIBUTION (258,8 KLB STRUT LOAD).

DEFLECTION TEST WITH THE TIRE PRESSURE AT 340 PSIG, A RADIAL LOAD OF 65,500 LBS WAS APPLIED AND HELD FOR ONE MINUTE. TIRE DEFLECTION WAS 32% (28% TO 35% IS ALLOWED).

ACCEPTANCE/TURNARQUIND (FOR ALL WHEEL/TIRE ASSEMBLIES) CONSISTS OF:

- (1) REINFLATE AND PERFORM 5 DAY COLD TEMP FOLLOWED BY 7 DAY AMBIENT TEMP LEAK TESTS.
- (2) STORAGE AT ROOM TEMP FOR 2 WEEKS.
- (3) INFLATION PRESSURE VERIFICATION.

OMRSD: FLIGHT TIRE DECAY RATE; THIS TEST DETERMINES THE DECAY RATE FOR EACH FLIGHT TIREWHEEL ASSEMBLY PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ML0308-0142 SPECIFICATION.

FLIGHT TIRE PRESSURE CHECKS:

THIS CHECK VERIFIES THE TIRE PRESSURE FOR EACH FLIGHT TIRE/WHEEL ASSEMBLY, PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ML0308-0143 SPECIFICATION, IF MORE THAN 30 DAYS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE THE LAST FLIGHT TIRE PRESSURE

TIRE PRESSURES FOR FLIGHT:

TIRE PRESSURES ARE VERIFIED FIVE DAYS BEFORE FINAL RETRACTION FOR FLIGHT. MLG TIRES FLIGHT PRESSURE REQUIREMENT IS 368 PSIG TO 370 PSIG.

MLG WHEEL/TIRE CERT:

VERIFIES MLG WHEEL/TIRE ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN BUILT UP AND TESTED PER THE VO70-510002 DRAWING, ML0308-0029 LANDING GEAR RIGGING SPECIFICATION AND ML0308-0142 MLG WHEEL/TIRE INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION SPECIFICATION.

FREQUENCY - ALL VEHICLES AT GROUND TURNAROUND.

(C) INSPECTION:

RECEIVING INSPECTION

RAW MATERIALS ARE VERIFIED ACCEPTABLE BY IN-HOUSE LABORATORY AT RECEIVING INSPECTION.

CONTAMINATION CONTROL

CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

BASIC COMPONENTS AND ASSEMBLIES ARE INSPECTED AND VERIFIED THROUGHOUT ASSEMBLY. GREEN TIRE VERIFIED CORRECT BY WEIGHT. CURED TIRE 100% VISUALLY INSPECTED.

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CRITICAL PROCESSES

CURING VERIFIED BY INSPECTION, CURING MOLD GAUGES AND INDICATORS ARE PERIODICALLY VERIFIED CORRECT.

TESTING

ATP IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

PACKAGING/HANDLING

HANDLING, PACKAGING AND STORAGE REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

(D) FAILURE HISTORY:

NONE.

(E) OPERATIONAL USE:

TIRE/WHEEL FAILURE BEFORE NLG TOUCHDOWN CREW WILL ATTEMPT TO USE AERO RUDDER AND BRAKING ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

TIRE/WHEEL FAILURE AFTER NLG TOUCHDOWN CREW WILL USE NWS, AERO RUDDER AND DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL.

- APPROVALS -

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